The US-Russia rapprochement has sparked significant concerns within China’s strategic circles. If the US-China détente was once an alliance to contain the Soviet Union, the renewed US-Russia talks have revived similar fears among the Chinese.
On February 18, 2025, high-level talks between the United States and Russia, led by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, marked a reset in bilateral ties and the end of Russia’s isolation since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. According to a four-point readout issued by the US Department of State, both sides explored avenues for ending the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and improving diplomatic and economic relations. Notably, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the European Union expressed concerns about being excluded from the talks.
A week later, on February 25, President Donald Trump revealed that the US and Ukraine had agreed to a draft critical minerals deal. It was also announced that President Zelenskyy would travel to the US on February 28 to finalize the agreement. The deal aims to establish a fund that would generate revenue from Ukraine’s natural resources and trade these for US military support for Ukraine. On the same day, in a dramatic shift, the US refused to condemn Russia’s aggression and sided with Russia in voting against a Europe-backed Ukrainian resolution. China has viewed these developments with alarm. Let’s examine how the Chinese strategic community has been reacting to them.
Ye Tianle and Zhang Ye of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) view the Russia-US talks—conducted while bypassing Ukraine and the EU—as “a return to a model where major powers unilaterally shape global security through bilateral agreements.” Zheng Yongnian, professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, examines US-Russia rapprochement through the lens of Trump’s “power politics” and describes it as “undeniably and brazenly imperialistic” (赤裸裸过于帝国主义). Albeit, there are others like Professor Wu Xinbo, Dean of the Institute of International Studies, Director of the Centre for American Studies, Fudan University who believes the Ukraine conflict has accelerated the process of multipolarity and diminished the US power.
Zheng criticizes the West, primarily Europe for also engaging in “power politics” (强权主义), but argues that Trump’s actions have exposed their hypocrisy, stripping away the “emperor’s new clothes” of the Western “democratic world order” that has prevailed since World War II. According to him, the West’s opposition to Russia has never been about territorial or sovereignty issues but rather an ideological battle between Ukraine’s democracy and Putin’s authoritarianism. However, he rules out a complete “sell-out,” despite Trump’s view that a return to the 2014 borders is unrealistic. Wu Xinbo on the other hand, claims that the US-Russia talks “mark the end of the post-Cold War era in Europe,” and that “Europe will form a new security order in which Russia’s interests will be respected.” He pronounces Europe as the biggest loser, gaining almost nothing from the Ukraine-Russia conflict.
Zheng argues that a US-Russia alignment would pressure Europe to focus on the Indo-Pacific, potentially bringing NATO into the region and posing a major challenge for China. If both the US and Russia shift their strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific, they could potentially form an alliance with India, which would be highly unfavourable for China. Ding Xiaoxing, Deputy Secretary-General of the Academic Committee of the CICIR, however, feels that Trump is more focused on domestic issues than on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Lu Yan, writing for Huayu Think Tank, asserts that US-Russia rapprochement is also a “strategic distraction” (围魏救赵) aimed at shielding Israel.
Reasoning China’s options in the aftermath of the US-Russia rapprochement, Zheng proposes that as a major power, China must actively participate in the peace process. He warns that if China remains passive, the worst-case scenario could emerge: “a US-Russia alliance against China.” He maintains this is not impossible, as early in Trump’s first term, Henry Kissinger reportedly suggested a similar strategy to counter China’s rise. Moreover, he believes there are some “anti-China sentiments” (对中国不太友好的情绪) prevalent within Russia, and that the country has long had pro-Western factions advocating for closer ties with the West.
Lu Yan presents a similar argument, asserting that “the US aims to disrupt the deepening China-Russia cooperation” and seeks to “drive a wedge” between China and Russia, which he describes as the “hidden imperialist design” (暗藏的霸权毒计) of the US Lu further argues that “without Russian support, China’s influence and bargaining power on key global issues could be compromised. The US would then seize this opportunity to intensify economic, technological, and military containment strategies against China, further solidifying its global dominance.”
Though there are visible anxieties in China about US-Russia alliance against China, nevertheless the strategic community argues that formation would not be easy. Zheng provides a few reasons in support of his argument. First, he says, China is not the Soviet Union; it has robust trade relations with many countries. Second, Putin will make his own judgments, and history shows that Russia has been deceived by the West on multiple occasions. Third, if Russia were to join the Western alliance, would it not pose challenges to US leadership? Would the US really want to cultivate such a strong internal competitor?
Kong Fan, a columnist with the Observer, echoes Zheng’s view when he states, “China’s advantage lies in Russia’s increasing economic dependence on it, especially in energy, technology, and infrastructure cooperation.” Therefore, any volte-face by Putin is ruled out. Conversely, he suggests that China’s mediation has played a role in bringing the US and Russia closer to a deal on Ukraine.
Though scholars agree that “a serious rift has emerged in the transatlantic partnership,” Europe’s exclusion, they argue, presents opportunities for China to strengthen its partnership with Europe and collaborate on Ukraine’s reconstruction alongside the US Kong notes that Chinese companies have already participated in Ukraine’s infrastructure projects, including ports, railways, and energy development. Additionally, China is a key market for Ukrainian agricultural products and military technology. However, to China’s surprise, the EU made a “controversial decision” to provoke China by including some Chinese entities in sanctions lists related to Russia on February 24, hoping to align with Trump’s stance.
Knowing that the US has no plans to share power with the EU in the Ukraine crisis, the EU in Ai Wen‘s view “made an astonishingly unwise decision – choosing to provoke China, thereby exposing its strategic blindness.” Writing for Huayu Think Tank, Ai calls the decision as “EU’s narrow strategic vision,” missing the opportunity to partner with China. Ai claims that a partnership with China “could have offered significant benefits in balancing US unilateralism and strengthening EU’s position in the geopolitical landscape.
Another takeaway from the US-Russia rapprochement according to Zheng is an opportunity to understand Trump’s concept of “holistic transactional approach” (总体性”交易观). He doesn’t consider Trump’s deals as “one-on-one” but Trump taking a comprehensive, strategic approach, bundling all negotiations, whether with Russia, Ukraine, the EU, or China – into a single, coordinated deal. He plays Go, not chess, focusing on the bigger picture. The US State Department’s modifications to its website—deleting the statement that it “does not support Taiwan independence” and replacing “China” with “People’s Republic of China” is a reflection of Trump’s bargaining strategy, according to Zheng. According to Ai Wen, Trump’s negotiation tactics are particularly effective: he first shocks with an exorbitant demand, only to later offer a seemingly more acceptable condition, as is the case of Ukraine’s coercion into submission.
The US-Russia rapprochement has sparked significant concerns within China’s strategic circles. If the US-China détente was once an alliance to contain the Soviet Union, the renewed US-Russia talks have revived similar fears among the Chinese. They perceive the US as tacitly accepting Russia’s control over eastern Ukraine in exchange for Russian concessions in other areas, including the South China Sea and Taiwan.
However, China remains confident that, unlike the Soviet Union, it is in a stronger position due to its deep economic ties with both the Global North and South. While the US-EU divide is seen as an opportunity, China remains cautious, given the EU’s increasingly adversarial stance. The EU appears to be the biggest loser, facing diminished strategic options and potential marginalization on the global stage. Although the EU is likely to remain aligned with the US, China believes that Russia is unlikely to side with the West due to factors such as China’s economic influence and past Western betrayals of Russia.
* B.R. Deepak is Professor, Center of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
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